Abstract
Introduction
The number of security-breaking attempts originated inside an organization is increasing steadily [5] [8] . These attacks are usually made by "authorized'' users of the system. Typically, in one type of intrusion, an attacker who is authorized to modify data records under certain constraints deliberately hides his intentions to change data beyond constraints in different operations and different transactions. Often, in this type of attack, each individual transaction is legitimate; however, the accumulated results of the attacker's operations are malicious.
The existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be grouped into two classes: (1) misuse detection, which maintains a database of known intrusion techniques or behaviors and detects intrusions by comparing users' behaviors against the database [7] [8]; (2) anomaly detection, which analyzes user behaviors and the statistics of a process in a normal situation, and checks whether the system is being used in a different manner [3] [9].
In general, misuse detection model cannot detect new, unknown intrusions [7] . Anomaly detection needs to maintain the records of users' behaviors and the statistics for normal usages, which is referred to as "profiles". The profiles tend to be large. That makes detecting intrusion needs a large amount of system resources, and delays detection decision makings. If attackers hide their operations into other places, anomaly detection may not even be able to detect them. It is fair to say that neither anomaly detection nor misuse detection would be able to effectively detect Cumulated Anomaly. New techniques need to be investigated.
In this study, we investigate Cumulated Anomaly and propose a model for detection. In this model, the detection rules are set up manually based on the statistical properties of intrusions amongst the normal transactions. In addition, membership functions [5] in fuzzy set theory, with their parameters specified into the detection rules, are applied in the model to monitor and present the possibility of intrusions in real time. Membership functions assist detection rules to indicate the likelihood of a transaction being intrusive. If a transaction is identified by a detection rule as a "possible" intrusion, it is said that the rule "matches" the transaction. An indicator (degree) within the interval [ , ] 0 1 will be calculated. This indicator is used to represent the dubiety degree of a transaction. Therefore, this model is named as DubietyDetermining Model (DDM). In this method, the dubiety of various types of database transactions can be quantitatively denoted in a unified form way. By showing the dubiety degrees of database transactions, the model can detect possible anomalies if their dubiety degrees are high.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews some related work briefly. Section 3 describes the DDM method. Design and implementation issues are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the experimental results are introduced. Section 6 is the conclusion.
Related work
The characteristics of widespread used databases with the invaluable data held in them make it vital to detect any intrusion or intrusion attempts made at the databases. Therefore, basing on the development of intrusion detections on computer systems, intrusion detection for databases is becoming imperative needs. Besides access policies, roles, administration procedures, physical security, security models, and data inference, misuse detection and anomaly detection at databases have been focused on. Christina Yip Chung, Michael Gertz and Karl Levitt developed DEMIDS, which is a misuse detection system for database systems tailored to relational database systems [2] . Francesco M. Malvestuto, Mauro Mezzini and Marina Moscarini propose an approach to avoid releasing summary statistics that could lead to the disclosure of confidential individual data in [4] . In [8] and [10] , Sin Yeung Lee, Wai Lup Low and Pei Yuen Wong describe an algorithm that summarizes the raw transactional SQL queries into compact regular expressions. All of them have pointed out that the content of transactions can be used to abstract the users' profiles, which will be used during misuse detection or anomaly detection. However, to make the detection results more precise, some quantitative approaches should be employed.
In the existing database intrusion detection researches, fuzzy set theory is mainly used with other theories such as neural network in building profiles for anomaly detection [1] [9] [11] . For example, [6] uses a fuzzy Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) and neural network to detect anomaly intrusion of database operations, by monitoring the connection activities to a database.
As a result, we have a motivation of integrating fuzzy set theory and intrusion detection technique to deal with Cumulated Anomaly in databases precisely in real time.
Dubiety-Determining Model (DDM)
Given a metric for a random variable X and n observations 1 , , n X X … , the purpose of the statistical sub-model of X is to determine whether a new observation 1 n X + is abnormal with respect to the previous observations. The mean avg and the standard deviation stdev of 1 , , n X X … are defined as:
X + is defined to be abnormal if it falls outside a confidence interval that is standard deviations from the mean, which is denoted by CI: CI 
Architecture based on DDM
The architecture for database transaction monitoring based on DDM is designed as shown in Figure 3 .
The Time_window specifies a number of hours as a time range. The audit records occurred in that time range before the currently being checked one will be sought by the rule.
Mon_type is the type of monitor. It has two values: C and S. C is used for counting numbers and S is for recording the sum value. Enable is a switch. When it is 1, the rule is valid; otherwise, it is not.
Experimental results
The experiments are performed on the DBMS of Microsoft SQL Server 2000 on Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP1, to show whether DDM can discover Cumulated Anomaly behaviors. The example database Northwind of SQL Server is used in this study. The table Products in it stores product-related data, including ProductID and UnitPrice. Suppose there is a product whose ProductID is 9 in Products. Assume a member of staff, Ann, is authorized to modify UnitPrice of Product 9. However, if the UnitPrice has been changed too much or too often, it could be suspicious. It is defined that UnitPrice should not be changed for more than 4 times in 30 days, and the sum of changed value should not be more than 3 pounds in 90 days. Audits Base and Detection Rules Base are built according to the two basic structures defined.
Data. 30000 normal audit records are stored in the database. Their schema is described in Section 4. They include Time_stamps (system clock) in a period of three months. The values of fields SQLText are common database operations in the form of SQL statements, including selecting data from a table, updating the data in a table, inserting data into or deleting data from a table, executing a procedure, and opening a database. Referring to the above assumptions, 12 additional audit records for Ann's updating UnitPrice of Products 9 are constructed and mixed into the existing 30000 audit records. These 12 records are distributed into the range of three months.
The Detection Rules Base (described in Section 4) contains two typical detection rules listed in Table 1 (in which the column of Enable is not listed to make the table not too wide). For example, R02 is used to monitor the audit records with Ann as UID, update [Products] set UnitPrice=p where ProductID=9 as SQLText (where p is a number). The data items before and after update operation are recorded in the fields Data1 and Data2. When an audit record R which meets the demand of R02 occurs, the algorithm seeks the audit records meeting the demand of R02 which have occurred 2160 hours before R , and sums up the margins between each pair of Data1 and Data2 in each of them. Then, the summation is substituted into U F defined in R02. Finally, a result value of the function is calculated as the dubiety degree of that audit record. As this is a real-time process; an audit record will be examined as soon as it arrives. Figure  4 shows all results. Figure 4 (a) shows the value of UnitPrice after Ann updates it for each time. Figure 4 (b) shows the monitor result of using the rule of R01.
We can see that the dubiety degree is increasing gradually. However, it does not reach 1 all the while. That means no anomaly occurs by R01. In general, when several detection rules are matched to the same audit record, the highest value of dubiety degree amongst these rules will be selected. From the results, we can see Ann's operations cause anomaly.
Conclusion
A new type of database anomaly Cumulated Anomaly is investigated. A new detection method Dubiety-Determining Model (DDM) has been proposed for it. Based on DDM, architecture for database transaction monitoring is designed and implemented.
Tests have been performed to verify the effectiveness of our novel method. The results suggest that our methods are capable of identifying suspicious user behaviors. We are currently considering developing a method based on DDM for general anomaly detection in databases. 
